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How to Conduct an AI Vulnerability Assessment in 5 Steps

AI vulnerability assessments identify and remediate risks across the AI lifecycle, using a five-step process to strengthen resilience and protect sensitive data.

In This Article

    An AI vulnerability assessment is a structured process to find, rank and fix security weaknesses in AI models, LLM applications and AI agents before attackers exploit them. It matters more each year: 87% of security leaders told the World Economic Forum that AI-related vulnerabilities were the fastest-growing cyber risk of 2025, while roughly one in three organizations still deploy AI tools with no security validation at all (Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026).

    This guide explains the five steps, the tests that map to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and MITRE ATLAS, how an assessment differs from an AI penetration test and how Mindgard automates the cycle.

    What is an AI Vulnerability Assessment? 

    An AI vulnerability assessment is a systematic review of an organization's AI models, applications and infrastructure to find, rank and fix weaknesses that attackers could exploit. Where a traditional vulnerability assessment looks for issues in networks or applications, an AI vulnerability assessment focuses on risks unique to machine learning and AI pipelines: prompt injection, data poisoning, model extraction and insecure integrations.

    Three public frameworks define the test catalog. The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025 edition) lists the ten most common weaknesses in LLM apps. MITRE ATLAS catalogs the tactics and techniques adversaries use against AI systems (Mindgard's MITRE ATLAS Adviser maps findings to it automatically). NIST AI 100-2 E2025 classifies adversarial machine learning attacks into evasion, poisoning, privacy and misuse.

    The assessment should cover the entire AI application lifecycle: data collection, preparation and storage, model training and fine-tuning, and model deployment to production, plus the prompts, retrieval stores, agents and tools added after deployment. Vulnerabilities can show up at any point in this chain, including:

    Data poisoning that skews training outcomes or retrieval results.

    • ‍Prompt injection attacks that trick large language models (LLMs) into ignoring instructions, leaking data or misusing tools.
    • ‍Model extraction attempts, where adversaries replicate proprietary models through repeated queries.
    • Excessive agency, where an AI agent holds more tool permissions than its task requires.
    • Supply chain weaknesses in downloaded model weights, datasets, plugins and MCP servers.
    • Insecure integrations that let model output reach browsers, shells or databases without validation.

    Assessing your AI infrastructure gives security teams visibility into their exposure levels. Teams can prioritize remediation before deploying models, which lowers the risk of model compromise and makes AI systems more reliable under real-world conditions.

    AI Vulnerability Assessment vs AI-Powered Vulnerability Management

    The phrase “AI vulnerability assessment” describes two different exercises, and only one of them tests your AI.

    For example, take a bank that has just shipped a customer-support chatbot on top of a hosted model. An AI-powered vulnerability scanner such as Wiz or Rapid7 will crawl the servers and containers behind that chatbot, flag an unpatched OpenSSL library and rank it against thousands of other CVEs. It will never type a prompt.

    An AI vulnerability assessment, on the other hand, sends the chatbot a support ticket that contains hidden instructions, checks whether the model follows them, tries to extract the system prompt, feeds the retrieval index a poisoned document and measures what the agent behind the chatbot can do with its account-lookup tool once it is compromised.

    The scanner tells you whether the infrastructure is patched. The assessment tells you whether the chatbot can be talked into leaking another customer's balance.

    This guide covers the second.

    Chart comparing AI and LLM vulnerability findings with traditional software:
    What an AI vulnerability assessment finds and how slowly it gets fixed. Sources: Cobalt AI and Pentesting Pulse Report 2026, WEF Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026, IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2026.

    What an AI Vulnerability Assessment Tests For

    An AI vulnerability assessment tests for the weaknesses catalogued in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 and MITRE ATLAS.

    The core test classes are:

    1. Prompt injection (OWASP LLM01, ATLAS AML.T0051), including indirect injection through documents, web pages and tool outputs
    2. Jailbreaks that bypass safety guardrails (AML.T0054)
    3. Sensitive information disclosure such as system prompt leakage and training data extraction (LLM02, LLM07)
    4. Data and model poisoning through training sets, fine-tuning data or retrieval corpora (LLM04, AML.T0020)
    5. Supply chain risks in downloaded model weights, datasets and plugins (LLM03, AML.T0010)
    6. Improper output handling that turns model output into XSS or command injection (LLM05)
    7. Excessive agency, where an agent holds more tool permissions than its task requires (LLM06)
    8. Vector and embedding weaknesses in RAG pipelines (LLM08)
    9. Model extraction through repeated API queries (AML.T0024)

    Cobalt's 2026 AI pentesting data shows why the order matters: prompt injection accounted for 37.6% of all AI and LLM findings, followed by insecure output handling at 10.2% and sensitive information disclosure at 6.2%.

    Vulnerability classOWASP LLM Top 10 (2025)MITRE ATLASWhat the test looks forTypical severity
    Prompt injection (direct and indirect)LLM01AML.T0051Injected text in chat, documents, web pages or tool outputs redirects the model or agentCritical
    JailbreaksLLM01AML.T0054Persona, encoding or multi-turn tricks bypass safety guardrailsCritical
    Sensitive information disclosureLLM02, LLM07AML.T0051.002System prompt, PII or training data leaks through model outputHigh
    Data and model poisoningLLM04AML.T0020Manipulated training, fine-tuning or retrieval data changes model behaviorHigh
    Supply chain (weights, datasets, plugins, MCP servers)LLM03AML.T0010Malicious serialized model files, unverified datasets or compromised connectorsHigh
    Improper output handlingLLM05n/aModel output reaches a browser, shell or database without validation (XSS, command injection)High
    Excessive agencyLLM06n/aAn agent holds more tools, permissions or autonomy than its task requiresCritical
    Vector and embedding weaknessesLLM08n/aRAG index exposes cross-tenant data or accepts poisoned chunksMedium
    Model extraction and membership inferencen/aAML.T0024Repeated API queries reconstruct the model or reveal training recordsMedium
    Adversarial evasionn/aAML.T0043Crafted inputs make classifiers, detectors or vision models failMedium
    Unbounded consumptionLLM10n/aNo rate limits or token budgets; denial of service and denial of walletMedium

    Sources: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025; MITRE ATLAS techniques; NIST AI 100-2 E2025. Severity reflects the share of high-risk findings by class in Cobalt's 2026 AI pentesting data.

    AI Vulnerability Assessment vs Vulnerability Scan vs AI Penetration Test

    An AI vulnerability assessment differs from an AI penetration test and from a traditional vulnerability scan in breadth, depth and cadence.

    A traditional vulnerability scan checks servers, networks and applications for known CVEs and misconfigurations; it does not send adversarial prompts to a model. Whereas, an AI vulnerability assessment covers the whole AI estate (models, data pipelines, prompts, retrieval stores, agents and integrations), identifies and ranks every weakness it finds and repeats on a schedule.

    An AI penetration test goes deeper on a narrower scope: a red team attempts to exploit specific findings end to end, for example chaining an indirect prompt injection into data exfiltration through an agent's email tool. Most programs run the assessment continuously and commission an AI penetration test or AI red teaming exercise on high-risk systems after major changes.

    Traditional vulnerability scanAI vulnerability assessmentAI penetration testAI red teaming
    What it testsServers, networks and applications for known CVEs and misconfigurationsThe AI system itself: models, prompts, retrieval data, agents, tools and the app around themSpecific AI weaknesses, exploited end to end to prove impactRealistic adversary campaigns against the AI system, its users and its operators
    Sends adversarial prompts?NoYes, automated at scaleYes, manual and automatedYes, plus social and multi-step attack chains
    OutputList of CVEs with CVSS scoresRanked findings mapped to OWASP LLM Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS, with fixesProof of exploit, attack narrative, remediation planCampaign report, detection gaps, control effectiveness
    Breadth vs depthBroad, shallowBroad, moderate depthNarrow, deepNarrow, deepest
    Typical cadenceWeekly to monthlyContinuous or monthly, plus every material changeQuarterly to annually, after major releasesAnnually or before high-risk launches
    Typical cost (2026)Included in scanner licenceAutomated platform subscription; $10K to $30K if run as a one-off consultant engagement$10K to $30K per engagement$20K to $100K+ per year as continuous PTaaS
    Who runs itIT or security operationsAI security team or platform such as MindgardSpecialist AI pentestersOffensive security team or vendor

    Cost ranges: Synack penetration testing pricing guide, June 2026. Cadence floor: AIUC-1 quarterly technical testing requirement.

    How to Conduct an AI Vulnerability Assessment

    Here's how to conduct an AI vulnerability assessment in five steps:

    1. Define the scope, including which AI systems, attack classes and frameworks are in play
    2. Inventory and prioritize every AI asset, from models and training data to prompts, retrieval stores, agents and tool connectors
    3. Test each asset for AI-specific vulnerabilities such as prompt injection, jailbreaks, data poisoning, model extraction and excessive agency
    4. Rank findings by exploitability and business impact and remediate the highest-ranked first
    5. Repeat on a cadence tied to change, with automated testing between assessments.

    Each step helps protect your models from security threats before an attacker finds them. The sections dives deeper into each step, the tests to run and the tools that run them.

    1. Define the Scope

    Start by defining the scope of your assessment so the work stays focused on the right assets and the right attacks. Answer five questions with the security, data science and product owners in the room:

    • ‍Which systems? Name each AI system in scope by type: LLM chat or assistant; retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) over internal documents; AI agent with tools or MCP servers; classic machine learning model (scoring, fraud, forecasting); computer vision or audio model; third-party AI feature embedded in a product. Each type gets a different test plan.
    • Which goals? Security, safety, compliance or all three. A compliance-driven assessment maps every test to a control in the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, ISO/IEC 42001 or the EU AI Act; a security-driven one maps to OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.
    • Which access? Black box (prompts and API only), grey box (system prompts and architecture documents) or white box (weights, training data and code). White box finds more; black box shows what an outside attacker sees.
    • Which boundaries? Production data that may not be touched, rate limits that must not be exceeded, third-party models whose terms restrict adversarial testing and any systems excluded from scope.
    • Who and when? The participating people, the timeline and who signs off on the findings.

    Write the answers into a one-page scope statement. It becomes the rules of engagement for step 3 and the baseline for every repeat assessment in step 5.

    2. Identify and Prioritize Assets

    Once the scope is set, build a complete inventory of everything an AI vulnerability could affect. This is the step most organizations skip: only 6% of security teams have complete visibility into their AI pipeline and 23% run shadow AI deployments, according to the 2026 AI Risk and Readiness Report (1,253 respondents). Inventory at minimum:

    • AI models, including third-party APIs, downloaded open weights and in-house fine-tunes
    • Training, fine-tuning and evaluation datasets and where they came from
    • System prompts, prompt templates and guardrail configurations
    • Retrieval stores: RAG indexes, vector databases and the document sources feeding them
    • Agents and their tools, MCP servers, plugins, credentials and memory stores
    • Supporting infrastructure, such as cloud instances, inference servers and monitoring systems
    • Integrations and APIs, user interfaces and software dependencies (including model file formats and serialization libraries)

    Then rank assets by three factors:

    1. Exposure (internal only, authenticated customers or anonymous internet users)
    2. Data sensitivity (public, internal or regulated)
    3. Autonomy (answers only, acts with approval or acts on its own)

    A high, medium and low score on each is enough to decide where testing effort goes first. The scoping tool below does this ranking for one system at a time and returns the test plan for step 3.

    AI Vulnerability Assessment Scoping Tool | Mindgard
    Mindgard
    AI Vulnerability Assessment Scoping Tool

    Scope your AI vulnerability assessment in 60 seconds

    Describe one AI system. The tool ranks its priority, builds the test plan mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and MITRE ATLAS and sets the retest cadence. Nothing you enter leaves this page.

    1. What kind of AI system is it? (pick every part that applies)
    2. Who can reach it?
    3. Most sensitive data it can see
    4. What can it do on its own?
    5. Where does the model come from?
    6. How often do prompts, models, tools or data sources change?
    Tier 2: High priority

    Your assessment scope

    Risk score0 / 12
    Retest cadenceMonthly
    Tests in plan0

    TestFramework IDPriority

    How this is calculated

    Risk score = exposure (0 to 2) + data sensitivity (0 to 2) + autonomy (0 to 2, doubled when the system is an agent) + model sourcing (0 to 2) + change rate (0 to 2), capped at 12. Score 0 to 3 is Tier 3 (standard), 4 to 7 is Tier 2 (high), 8 to 12 is Tier 1 (critical). Cadence: Tier 1 weekly automated testing, Tier 2 monthly, Tier 3 quarterly; every tier retests after a material change. Tests are selected by system type and settings and mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 and MITRE ATLAS technique IDs. The quarterly floor follows the AIUC-1 requirement for quarterly technical testing. All figures are computed from your inputs; none are external statistics.

    Method: Mindgard, September 2026. Framework references: OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, MITRE ATLAS, NIST AI 100-2 E2025. Prioritisation weights informed by Cobalt's 2026 AI pentesting data (prompt injection 37.6% of AI findings).

    3. Test for AI-Specific Vulnerabilities

    Test each asset against the attack classes that apply to it, not against a generic IT checklist. Start with threat modeling to map how an attacker could compromise your assets, then run these tests:

    • ‍LLM applications: direct prompt injection, indirect prompt injection through uploaded files, web content and retrieved documents, jailbreak probes, system prompt extraction and output handling checks.
    • AI agents: excessive agency tests that measure what an injected instruction can make the agent do with its tools, credentials and memory, plus supply chain review of every MCP server and plugin.
    • Models and pipelines: adversarial evasion inputs, training and fine-tuning data poisoning checks, membership inference and model extraction attempts against the inference API.
    • Model artifacts: scanning downloaded weights and serialized files for malicious code and verifying provenance, which is what Mindgard's model scanning automates.

    Combine automated tools with manual review. 78% of security teams said fully automated scanners missed critical vulnerabilities in 2026, and 47% now prefer a hybrid of automation and human testers (Cobalt AI and Pentesting Pulse Report 2026).

    The table below lists the open source and enterprise options; for a deeper comparison see our guide to AI pentesting tools. Mindgard's platform runs an attack library maintained by its research team (catalogued in the AI vulnerability database) continuously against models, agents and applications.

    ToolTierWhat it doesBest forNotes
    MindgardEnterpriseContinuous automated AI red teaming, model artifact scanning, agent and MCP testing, runtime protectionLLM apps, agents, models, RAGReports mapped to OWASP, MITRE ATLAS and NIST
    garak (NVIDIA)Open SourceLLM vulnerability scanner with probes for prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage and toxicityLLM endpointsPython CLI; wide probe library
    PyRIT (Microsoft)Open SourcePython risk identification toolkit for red teaming generative AI, multi-turn attack orchestrationLLM apps, multimodal modelsBuilt by the Microsoft AI Red Team
    PromptfooOpen SourceEvaluation and red teaming framework with OWASP LLM Top 10 plugins and CI integrationLLM apps, RAG, agentsYAML config; runs in CI pipelines
    GiskardOpen SourceAutomated vulnerability scanning for LLM and tabular models (hallucination, injection, bias)LLM apps, ML modelsPython library
    Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (IBM, LF AI)Open SourceEvasion, poisoning, extraction and inference attacks and defenses for ML modelsClassic ML, vision, audioResearch-grade attack implementations
    modelscan (Protect AI)Open SourceScans serialized model files (pickle, PyTorch, TensorFlow, Keras) for malicious codeModel artifactsSupply chain check before loading weights
    OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025FrameworkCatalog of the ten most common LLM application weaknesses with mitigationsScoping and reportingReference, not a tool
    MITRE ATLASFrameworkAdversary tactics and techniques against AI systems, with case studiesThreat modeling and mappingReference, not a tool

    Compiled by Mindgard from each project's public documentation, September 2026. Why combine automated and manual testing: 78% of security teams say automated scanners missed critical vulnerabilities (Cobalt, June 2026).

    Block's security team ran exactly this kind of test on its own coding agent, Goose. Its CISO summarized the working assumption every agent assessment should start from:

    “With our internal usage, we have to assume that prompt injection is possible.”
    - James Nettesheim, Chief Information Security Officer, Block. The Register, 12 January 2026

    Assume the injection lands, then measure what it can reach: that is the difference between testing an agent and testing a chatbot.

    4. Prioritize and Remediate by Exploitability and Impact

    Rank findings by exploitability and business impact, not by a static severity label. Fix the highest-ranked first. Ask three questions of every finding: can an unauthenticated user trigger it, what data or actions does it expose and does a compensating control already block it? AI vulnerabilities need this discipline more than most.

    Cobalt's 2026 pentest data rated 32% of AI and LLM findings high or critical, 2.7 times the 12% rate for traditional software, yet only 38.4% of AI and LLM findings were resolved, the lowest rate of any asset class.

    Many cannot be patched in the model at all. The fix for a prompt injection vulnerability is usually architectural: strip or sandbox untrusted content before it reaches the model, enforce least privilege on agent tools, validate outputs before they reach a browser or shell and require human approval for high-risk actions. Retest every fix in a controlled environment before release and re-run the original attack to confirm the finding is closed.

    Cobalt's CTO drew the same conclusion from the 38.4% resolution rate:

    “The poor resolution rate of AI is largely attributable to issues within LLM models themselves, which security professionals often cannot fix directly.”
    - Gunter Ollmann, Chief Technology Officer, Cobalt. Business Wire, 21 April 2026

    That is why step 4 ranks findings by what a compensating control can block, not by what a patch can fix.

    5. Repeat on a Cadence Tied to Change

    AI vulnerability assessments are an ongoing part of securing AI models, especially those that use proprietary or sensitive data. New attack techniques appear, models get swapped, prompts get edited and agents gain tools, so yesterday's clean assessment says nothing about today's system.

    How often should you run an AI vulnerability assessment? Quarterly is the minimum for any AI system in production. The AIUC-1 standard requires quarterly technical testing to hold a certificate.

    Internet-facing LLM applications and AI agents, on the other hand, need weekly automated assessment (continuous AI pentesting), because prompts, models, tools and retrieval data change faster than a quarterly cycle can track.

    On top of the fixed cadence, run an assessment before every production launch and after every material change:

    • A new model version or fine-tune
    • A system prompt change
    • A new tool or MCP connector granted to an agent
    • A new document source in a RAG index
    • A new user population or a new deployment channel

    The World Economic Forum found that only 40% of organizations run periodic security reviews of their AI tools rather than a single pre-deployment check (Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026). Cobalt's 2026 data shows the median time to fix an AI or LLM finding grew from 19 days to 36 days in a year, so infrequent assessment lets findings accumulate faster than teams can close them.

    Real-time monitoring of model inputs and outputs covers the gaps between assessments.

    Microsoft's AI Red Team, after testing more than 100 generative AI products, made this the last of its eight lessons:

    “The work of securing AI systems will never be complete.”
    - Blake Bullwinkel, Ram Shankar Siva Kumar, Mark Russinovich and colleagues, Microsoft AI Red Team. Lessons From Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products, arXiv, January 2025

    Treat the assessment as a loop, not a project with an end date.

    How Much Does an AI Vulnerability Assessment Cost?

    An AI vulnerability assessment costs between roughly $10,000 and $30,000 as a one-off consultant engagement and $20,000 to $100,000 or more per year as a continuous testing subscription, based on Synack's June 2026 penetration testing pricing guide. Price is driven by four variables:

    1. The number of models, applications and agents in scope
    2. Whether testing is black box (prompts only) or white box (access to weights, prompts and retrieval data)
    3. The depth of exploitation required
    4. The reporting and retesting included

    Automated AI red teaming platforms such as Mindgard price on the number of systems under continuous test rather than per engagement, which is why internal teams that assess quarterly or more often usually pay less per assessment than teams that commission ad hoc tests.

    Weigh either figure against the downside: IBM's 2026 Cost of a Data Breach report put the average cost of a breach involving an AI-driven attack at $5.99 million, $1 million above the global average. The same report found that 92% of organizations with an AI security incident lacked basic access controls on the AI system.

    From Assessment to Action

    The five steps in this guide give you a repeatable process that keeps pace with changes to your AI systems. Running them by hand, on every model, prompt and agent, does not scale.

    Mindgard's platform automates the cycle. Its AI Assessment and Artifact Scanning capabilities provide automated AI vulnerability assessment to help organizations:

    • Continuously monitor and test AI models, agents and datasets for emerging threats
    • Detect and respond to vulnerabilities faster using real-time alerts
    • Run AI-specific attacks that generic IT vulnerability scanners cannot, with findings mapped to OWASP, MITRE ATLAS and NIST

    See it against your own systems: Book your Mindgard demo today.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Who should be involved in an AI vulnerability assessment?

    A cross-functional team works best. This typically includes AI engineers, data scientists, security professionals, compliance officers and, when relevant, third-party security partners.

    How do I prioritize which vulnerabilities to fix first?

    Prioritize fixes by likelihood of exploitation and potential impact.

    The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) works for infrastructure findings, but it scores prompt injection and excessive agency poorly because those weaknesses depend on what the model can reach rather than on a software flaw.

    For AI findings, rank by three questions:

    1. Can an unauthenticated user trigger it
    2. What data or actions does it expose
    3. Does a compensating control already block it

    Then remediate critical and high findings first.

    Is threat modeling really necessary if I’m already scanning for vulnerabilities?

    Yes. Scans identify existing weaknesses, but threat modeling helps predict future vulnerabilities and potential attack paths, allowing you to stay ahead of risks rather than just react to them.

    What is the difference between an AI risk assessment and an AI vulnerability assessment?

    An AI risk assessment and an AI vulnerability assessment answer different questions.

    An AI risk assessment evaluates the business, legal and ethical consequences of deploying an AI system, following frameworks such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and ISO/IEC 42001 and produces a risk register with owners and treatments.

    An AI vulnerability assessment is the technical exercise inside that program: it tests the system for exploitable weaknesses such as prompt injection and data poisoning and produces ranked findings with fixes.

    Run the risk assessment first to decide which systems matter most, then run vulnerability assessments on those systems on a schedule.

    How do I assess vulnerabilities in AI agents?

    To assess vulnerabilities in AI agents, test what an attacker can make the agent do with its tools, not just what it can be made to say.

    An AI agent vulnerability assessment starts with an inventory of every tool, API, credential and memory store the agent can reach. It then runs indirect prompt injection tests through each untrusted input the agent reads (email, web pages, documents, tickets and tool outputs) and measures whether injected instructions trigger tool calls, data exfiltration or state changes.

    It checks for excessive agency (OWASP LLM06) by removing any permission the task does not require and requiring human approval for irreversible actions such as payments, deletions and outbound messages. It treats MCP servers and plugins as supply chain components and tests them for prompt injection in tool descriptions and responses.

    ‍NIST's Center for AI Standards and Innovation opened a request for information on securing AI agent systems in January 2026, naming indirect prompt injection, data poisoning and specification gaming as the risks to measure. For the full list of weaknesses, see the security risks of AI agents.

    How often should an AI vulnerability assessment be repeated?

    At least quarterly for every production AI system, weekly (automated) for internet-facing LLM applications and agents and after every material change: a new model version, a system prompt edit, a new tool or MCP connector, a new RAG document source or a new user population.

    Which tools can I use for an AI vulnerability assessment?

    Open source options include garak (NVIDIA), PyRIT (Microsoft), Promptfoo, Giskard, the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (IBM) and modelscan (Protect AI). Enterprise platforms such as Mindgard add continuous automated red teaming, model scanning, agent and MCP testing, runtime protection and reporting mapped to OWASP, MITRE ATLAS and NIST.

    Is an AI vulnerability assessment the same as AI-powered vulnerability management?

    No. AI-powered vulnerability management uses machine learning to find and prioritize conventional IT vulnerabilities such as CVEs in servers and applications. An AI vulnerability assessment tests the AI system itself (models, prompts, retrieval data, agents and tools) for weaknesses such as prompt injection, data poisoning and excessive agency.

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